Wittingly or not, Elizabeth Economy's The Third Revolution: Xi
Jinping and the New Chinese State largely follows this analytical mode in an attempt to make sense of China's contemporary transformation under the leadership of Xi Jinping. "Deng's 'second revolution' had drawn to a close," Economy asserts, and "Xi Jinping's 'third revolution' was underway" (p. 10). She judiciously selects six areas of Xi's top reform priorities for critical examination. Chapters 2 to 7 each provide a captivating account of the transformation of China's political institutions and processes that led to the dramatic centralization of authority. These are symbolized by the declaration of Xi as the core of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, the intensified penetration of society by the party-state through the control of the internet and of the free flow of ideas and information, the reassertion of the party in the decision-making of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the expanded role of the SOEs in core sectors of the Chinese economy, the government's drive to reinvent China as an innovative nation, the war on pollution, and finally China's ambition under Xi to reassert itself as a great power in world politics through the exercise of its growing hard and soft power.
Economy investigates these ongoing transformative changes in China not as a disinterested academic but as an acutely involved policy analyst concerned with understanding the "seeming inconsistencies and ambiguities of Chinese policy today" (p. x). Her study attempts "to assess the relative success or shortcomings of the Chinese leadership's initiatives on their own merits" (p. xi). The analysis is punctuated by conversations with Chinese officials, interviews of think-tank analysts and civil-society activists, and discussions with Chinese scholars in Beijing, Shanghai, Dubai, and Washington, D.C. There are also encounters with Jack Ma at the Economic Club of New York and debates at New York University. Cutting through the maze of what she calls "fast-changing, contradictory and occasionally misleading information" (p. x) about the transformation of China that has arguably overloaded information circuits, Economy has carefully woven a rich tapestry that provides a big picture while also including telling and baroque details of China's ongoing political, economic, and social transformations, as well as the country's changing foreign policy and international strategy, under Xi's leadership. In this tapestry, the third revolution is not just seen as a top-down transformation imposed by Xi. Equally constitutive of it are Chinese society's resistance and contestation to, as well as its discontent about, such imposition as demonstrated in the book's narrative about the struggles of the publications Nanfang Zhoumo and Yanhuang Chunqiu (pp. 20-21) as well as the story of Michael Anti (pp. 55-58). Also discussed are the heroic efforts of Chai Jing, Ma Jun, and Wang Canfa in China's war on pollution (pp. 175-78). Such stories make The Third Revolution an absorbing book to read.
It is hardly disputable that the state-society relationship in China has been profoundly changed by far-reaching political, economic, and social transformations in the years of Xi's leadership and that there has been a radical reorientation of Chinese foreign policy, as Economy's study eloquently and convincingly demonstrates. Describing and interpreting the tensions and contradictions inherent in such transformation in terms of revolution is, however, fraught with conceptual difficulties and analytical risks. Revolution is by definition associated with human emancipation and with the progressive, sometimes violent, struggle often waged from below against subjugation and oppression. Reasserting the CCP's control over the political, economic, and social life of Chinese people and society by whatever means necessary is, in this sense, reactionary rather than revolutionary. Amending the constitution to allow Xi to rule for life is not progressive by any stretch of the imagination. It is regressive. Even granting that there are multiple forms of revolution, the struggles and collaborations between the state and society in promoting environmental protection and enhancing the national capacity for innovation can hardly be captured adequately in terms of revolution, either normatively or analytically.
There is also the international dimension of the revolution to consider. As John Dunn argued, "There are no domestic revolutions."
2 It follows that the third revolution cannot be "caged" within Chinese borders. To what extent, then, can China be regarded as a revolutionary power in contemporary international relations? Where is the revolutionary agency that China has exerted on the liberal international order? It is indeed questionable whether revolution is a central feature of the self-conception of Xi's China today. Exercising soft power through Confucius Institutes is hardly revolutionary. Even if it is accepted that the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank have counter-hegemonic potential, they are not really revolutionary. Neither challenges the constitutive norms and rules of liberal international order. "An illiberal state seeking leadership in a liberal world order" (p. 17) might be an anomaly and highly contradictory, but it is not revolutionary. No power can be both responsible and revolutionary at the same time. One great paradox of China's transformation, as noted by Economy, is precisely Xi's efforts to position China as "a standard-bearer for globalization" (p. 231). It is hard to imagine a revolutionary power (i.e., China) to be simultaneously "the biggest and most important driver of the global free market," as Ian Bremmer calls the country on the book jacket.
It is true that "Xi seeks greatness for China" (p. 229). Arguably, to make China wealthy and powerful again has been the shared purpose of all Chinese revolutions, and Chinese revolutionaries, from the Republican, through the Nationalist and the Communist, to the second and third revolutions. The difference is perhaps that in the 21st century, Xi dares now to dream of "a world-class military, a game-changing economy with world-class technology, and a global footprint that matches-and perhaps even exceeds-that of any other country" as the trappings of what he envisages as the great rejuvenated Chinese nation (p. 229). Sweeping narratives of revolution, nevertheless, capture at best only partially what has happened in his pursuit of the realization of the "China dream." All said and done, at a certain point, revolution as a critical term has diminishing analytical returns in explaining and understanding Xi's distinctive strategy in initiating the recent transformation of the Chinese state and society.
Be that as it may, Economy's deep knowledge, insightful analysis, and engaging style of writing make The Third Revolution a highly rewarding read for anyone who wishes to understand the contradictions and paradoxes in the political, economic, and social trajectories of Xi's China. To the extent that China's third revolution can be seen as Mao's revenge-the latent return of the personality cult and the anxieties about Xi unleashing the Cultural Revolution redux, the analysis of which is not found in The Third Revolution-no one should be surprised that China's "fourth revolution," if ever there should be one in the distant horizon, will be Deng's revenge. 
